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I. INTRODUCTION
National security and trade policy have frequently intersected, but
over the past several years, conflict has grown. After decades of careful
avoidance of invoking national security in disputes at the GATT/WTO,
there has been a recent proliferation of these cases. And most
controversially, the Trump administration has adopted an expansive
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interpretation of “national security” to justify imposing tariffs and
quotas on steel and aluminum products (which it may soon apply to
automobiles). Many US trading partners responded immediately with
tariffs of their own, and both the US tariffs and the retaliatory tariffs
are the subject of litigation that will test the limits of the WTO dispute
settlement process and the trading system itself.
A WTO panel ruling in a different case involving national security
has just been published, but it is not clear that any legal ruling can
satisfy the parties to disputes where national security has been invoked.
This Essay describes the problems with litigation on such matters, and
suggests an alternative mechanism to handle these issues. Instead of
litigation, a “rebalancing” process like the one used in the context of
“safeguard” tariffs and quotas should be utilized for national security
trade restrictions. Where such measures are taken, governments should
offer compensation (such as lowering trade restrictions in other areas);
if compensation cannot be worked out, these governments must accept
equivalent trade restrictions imposed by affected trading partners. In
this way, the overall balance in the system can be preserved, permanent
damage to the WTO dispute system avoided, and a potentially
destructive loophole kept closed.
II. HISTORY OF THE GATT/WTO “SECURITY” EXCEPTION
From the earliest post-World War I proposals for international
trade agreements, it was clear that there would be some sort of
exception for “security” concerns. Exception provisions for security
and military issues were included in the 1927 Convention for the
Abolition of Import and Export Prohibitions and Restrictions, 1 and
were also part of the reciprocal trade agreements signed in the 1930s
and early 1940s. 2 During the negotiations on the International Trade
Organization and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(“GATT”), similar exceptions were part of the initial US proposal,
referred to as the Suggested Charter. 3 The specific wording evolved
during the negotiations, but in the final text of the GATT, Article XXI
said the following:
1. Convention for the Abolition of Import and Export Prohibitions and Restrictions art. 4,
Nov. 8, 1927, 46 Stat. 2461.
2. See, e.g., Agreement between the United States of America and Mexico Respecting
Reciprocal Trade art. XVII, U.S.-Mex., Dec. 23, 1942, 57 Stat. 833.
3. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, SUGGESTED CHARTER FOR AN INTERNATIONAL TRADE
ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, art. 32 (1946).
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Security Exceptions
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed
(a) to require any contracting party to furnish any information the
disclosure of which it considers contrary to its essential security
interests; or
(b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which
it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security
interests
(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which
they are derived;
(ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of
war and to such traffic in other goods and materials as is carried
on directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military
establishment;
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international
relations; or
(c) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action in
pursuance of its obligations under the United Nations Charter for
the maintenance of international peace and security. 4
When the WTO was created in 1995, and trade rules were expanded to cover
trade in services and intellectual property, a similar security exception was
included in these areas as well. 5

The original negotiators recognized the political difficulties that
would arise with such an exception and the potential for abuse. As one
of the lead US negotiators put it:
It is really a question of a balance. We have got to have some
exceptions. We cannot make it too tight, because we cannot
prohibit measures which are needed purely for security reasons.
On the other hand, we cannot make it so broad that, under the guise
of security, countries will put on measures which really have a
commercial purpose. 6
4. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XXI, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
5. See GATS art. XIV bis; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights art. 73, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1197, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299.
6. U.N., Econ. & Soc. Council, Second Session of the Preparatory Comm. of the U.N.
Conf. on Trade & Employment, Thirty-Third Meeting of Commission, U.N. Doc.
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Determining the true purpose of a measure can be difficult, and the
negotiators recognized the possibility that protectionist measures could
be disguised as national security measures. As another GATT
negotiator put it:
In defence of the text, we might remember that it is a paragraph of
the Charter of the ITO and when the ITO is in operation I think the
atmosphere inside the ITO will be the only efficient guarantee
against abuses of the kind to which the Netherlands Delegate has
drawn our attention. 7

Over most of the history of the GATT/WTO, governments kept
these concerns in mind and the atmosphere cool, and, for the most part,
were careful to invoke national security only where it was genuinely
applicable. In one of the most comprehensive articles on this exception,
written in 2011, legal scholar Roger Alford noted that “Member States
have exercised good faith in complying with their trade obligations,”
as “invocations of the security exception have only been challenged a
handful of times, and those challenges have never resulted in a binding
GATT/WTO decision.” 8 Alford then recounts the few instances where
tensions over Article XXI rose to the surface, including over Cold War
conflicts, the Falklands War, and the US embargoes on Nicaragua and
Cuba. 9 As a result of governments’ good faith efforts, the GATT/WTO
system has been able to avoid major conflict over this issue and having
to decide on the precise boundaries of Article XXI.
Unfortunately, the long period of relative peace and harmony over
Article XXI seems to be ending, as a WTO dispute between Ukraine
and Russia has recently provided the first WTO panel interpretation of
the provision. But a dispute between the Ukraine and Russia is not
likely to undermine the world trading system. The more serious
national security/trade policy controversy taking place is the dispute
E/PC/T/A/PV/33, p. 21 (July 24, 1947), available at https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/UN/EPCT/
APV-33.PDF [https://perma.cc/VF47-WPAK].
7. Id.
8. Roger P. Alford, The Self-judging WTO Security Exception, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 697,
699 (2011).
9. Id. at 706-725. See also Tania Voon, The Security Exception In WTO Law: Entering a
New Era, 113 AJIL UNBOUND 45, 45-50 (2019), available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/
journals/american-journal-of-international-law/article/security-exception-in-wto-law-enteringa-new-era/CF8C3DCDF2CD924CAEEDD147840668F9 [https://perma.cc/WQZ4-4Z8P].
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over the tariffs recently imposed by the Trump administration on
imports of steel and aluminum. Nine governments have brought WTO
complaints against these measures, and many of these governments
have also retaliated with tariffs of their own. 10 This litigation and
subsequent retaliation threatens to do serious damage to the system.
III. THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S AGGRESSIVE USE OF
SECTION 232
A. Overview of Section 232
As part of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, and building on
legislation passed in 1955, Congress included in Section 232 of the
statute a provision for trade restrictions based on national security. This
was in the midst of the Cold War, when national security concerns were
at their height. Congress believed it was appropriate to delegate some
of its constitutional power over trade to the President in case quick
action was necessary. 11
Section 232 gives the President the authority to “adjust imports”
on national security grounds, in other words, to impose trade
restrictions. 12 A decision to impose these restrictions is based on an
investigation by the Commerce Department, which must involve
consultations with the Secretary of Defense. The Commerce
Department investigation can be self-initiated, or it can take place upon
request of any US department or agency, or the domestic industry.
During the investigation, the Commerce Department considers a
number of factors when evaluating the impact of imports on national
security, including the following: domestic production needed for
national defense requirements, the capacity of domestic industries to
meet such requirements, and how the importation of goods affects such
industries and the capacity of the United States to meet national
security requirements. The Department must also take into

10. RACHEL F. FEFER ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45249, SECTION 232
INVESTIGATIONS: OVERVIEW AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (2018), available at
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45249.pdf [https://perma.cc/89ZN-9U3A].
11 . Id.; David Knoll, Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962: Industrial
Fasteners, Machine Tools and Beyond, 10 MD. J. INT’L L. & TRADE 55, 56-57 (1986), available
at https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1274&context=mjil
[https://perma.cc/CHG9-H9S2].
12. 19 U.S.C. §1862 (2012).
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consideration the impact of foreign competition on the economic
welfare of individual domestic industries.
The investigation shall last no longer than 270 days, and the
Secretary of Commerce is required to submit a report to the President
and include recommendations of action or inaction. 13 Within ninety
days of receiving the report, the President will make a decision, and
may either follow the recommendations of the Commerce Department
or take other actions. 14 Generally speaking, these actions will be in the
form of tariffs or quotas, but many variations are possible.
To date, there have been thirty-one Section 232 investigations,
twenty-six prior to Trump and five during his term in office. The first
seven cases covered a wide range of products (including watches, antifriction bearings, and power circuit breakers). 15 Six resulted in a
negative determination, and one was withdrawn by the petitioner. 16
Then during the oil crisis of the 1970s, there were a number of cases
involving petroleum products, including the first case in which the
Commerce Department reached a positive determination. 17
Overall, in sixteen cases the Commerce Department determined
that the goods did not threaten to impair national security; and in eleven
cases, the Commerce Department found the imported goods threatened
to impair national security, and provided recommendations to the
President. 18 One case was terminated at the petitioner’s request before
a conclusion was reached. Three investigations are still pending. 19
The first twenty-four cases were from 1963 to 1994. 20 After that,
the mechanism fell into disuse. There were cases in 1999 and 2001, but
then nothing for sixteen years. 21 Since President Trump took office in
January 2017, there have been five Section 232 investigations, on steel,
aluminum, autos and auto parts, uranium, and titanium sponges. 22

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

19 U.S.C. §1862(b)(3) (2012).
19 U.S.C. § 1862(c) (2012).
FEFER ET AL., supra note 10.
FEFER ET AL., supra note 10.
FEFER ET AL., supra note 10.
FEFER ET AL., supra note 10. In eight of these eleven cases, the President took action.
FEFER ET AL., supra note 10.
FEFER ET AL., supra note 10.
FEFER ET AL., supra note 10.
FEFER ET AL., supra note 10.
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B. The Section 232 Actions on Steel and Aluminum
As a candidate, Trump vowed to bring jobs in the steel and
aluminum sectors back: “We are going to put American steel and
aluminum back into the backbone of our country,” Trump said to his
supporters in a former steel town in Pennsylvania. 23 Steel and
aluminum were at the center of his America First trade policy. Soon
after Trump took office, in April 2017, he instructed the Commerce
Department to initiate investigations on the national security threat
posed by steel and aluminum imports. 24 The Department immediately
initiated Section 232 investigations on steel and aluminum and sought
public comments. 25
In January 2018, the Department issued its report. It concluded
that certain types of steel and aluminum products imported into the
United States threaten to impair the national security of the United
States. The Department recommended that the President reduce
imports through tariffs or quotas, suggesting three options. For steel, it
recommended: (1) a tariff of 24% on all steel imports, or (2) a tariff of
53% or more for steel imports from twelve countries plus a quota for
all other nations that equals their exports to the United States in 2017,
or (3) a quota of 63% of each country’s 2017 steel exports to the United
States. For aluminum, it recommended: (1) a tariff of 7.7% on all
aluminum imports, or (2) a tariff of 23.6% for aluminum imports from
five countries plus a quota for all other nations that equals their exports
to the United States in 2017, or (3) a quota of 86.7% of each country’s
2017 aluminum exports to the United States. 26
23. Susan Jones, Trump: ‘Put American Steel and Aluminum Back Into the Backbone of
Our Country’, CNS NEWS (June 29, 2016), https://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/susanjones/trump-put-american-steel-and-aluminum-back-backbone-our-country [https://perma.cc/
5LY5-YAW7].
24. Donald J. Trump, Memorandum on Steel Imports and Threats to National Security,
2017 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. (Apr. 20, 2017), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/
pkg/DCPD-201700259/pdf/DCPD-201700259.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ACV-5NTU]; Donald J.
Trump, Memorandum on Aluminum Imports and Threats to National Security, 2017 DAILY
COMP. PRES. DOC. (Apr. 27, 2017), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD201700284/pdf/DCPD-201700284.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z4VV-DHFU].
25. See Notice of Request for Public Comments and Public Hearing on Section 232
National Security Investigation of Imports of Steel, 82 Fed. Reg. 19205 (Apr. 26, 2017); Notice
of Request for Public Comments and Public Hearing on Section 232 National Security
Investigation of Imports of Aluminum, 82 Fed. Reg. 21509 (May 9, 2017).
26. U.S. Dep’t of Com., Secretary Ross Releases Steel and Aluminum 232 Reports in
Coordination with White House, U.S. DEP’T OF COM. (2018), https://www.commerce.gov/news/
press-releases/2018/02/secretary-ross-releases-steel-and-aluminum-232-reports-coordination
[https://perma.cc/8ESX-GLMR].
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On March 8, 2018, President Trump issued two proclamations,
imposing a twenty-five percent ad valorem tariff on steel products and
a ten percent ad valorem tariff on aluminum products, taking effect on
March 23, 2018. Some countries negotiated export quotas to avoid the
tariffs, and others received temporary tariff exemptions, but as of June
1, 2018, the tariffs were being imposed on most US trading partners.27
The tariffs have been estimated to apply to US$44.9 billion worth of
steel and aluminum imports. 28
In terms of the actual purpose of the actions, there were reasons
to doubt the claimed national security justification, as the Defense
Department was skeptical of the value of these tariffs. Then-Secretary
of Defense James Mattis expressed concern about the “negative
impact” of the tariffs “on our key allies.” 29 He also acknowledged that
the military’s requirements for steel and aluminum can be satisfied with
about three percent of domestic production, casting doubt on the
concerns about the impact of imports and on the justification of the
Section 232 actions. 30
Beyond national security, a number of explanations have been
offered by President Trump to justify the tariffs. At times, he has
emphasized that tariffs would protect the US economy and jobs. 31 He
has also linked the tariffs to trade negotiations, suggesting that these
tariffs have forced US trading partners to the negotiating table. 32 A
further explanation is that the tariffs are being used to combat unfair
trade practices. 33 Ultimately, we do not know the true motivation of
27. FEFER ET AL., supra note 10.
28. Sherman Robinson et al., Trump’s Proposed Auto Tariffs Would Throw US
Automakers and Workers Under the Bus, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. (May 31, 2018),
https://piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/trumps-proposed-auto-tariffs-wouldthrow-us-automakers-and [https://perma.cc/WRV9-HT6V].
29. Ellen Mitchell, Trump Tariffs Create Uncertainty for Pentagon, THE HILL (Mar. 11,
2018), https://thehill.com/policy/defense/377697-trump-tariffs-create-uncertainty-for-pentagon
[https://perma.cc/MF8Z-JPYP].
30. Id.
31. Donald J. Trump, (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Mar. 2, 2018, 5:01 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/969558431802806272
[https://perma.cc/GT6YAE6W] (“We must protect our country and our workers. Our steel industry is in bad shape. IF
YOU DON’T HAVE STEEL, YOU DON’T HAVE A COUNTRY!”).
32. Andrew Mayeda, Trump Turns Steel Tariffs Into Nafta Bargaining Chip, BLOOMBERG
(Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-06/steel-tariffs-transforminto-nafta-chip-as-trump-plays-dealmaker.
33. A White House fact sheet explained: “President Donald J. Trump is addressing global
overcapacity and unfair trade practices in the steel and aluminum industries by putting in place
a 25 percent tariff on steel imports and 10 percent tariff on aluminum imports.” President Donald
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President Trump for these tariffs—it should be noted that Trump often
makes it clear that he simply likes tariffs 34—and views may vary within
the administration.
Many US trading partners responded quickly to the imposition of
the Section 232 tariffs by imposing retaliatory tariffs. Normally,
governments would have to bring a WTO complaint first and get a
ruling that tariffs violate WTO rules before proceeding with retaliatory
tariffs. 35 But here, governments argued that the Section 232 measures
are not really about national security, and are in fact more like a
“safeguard” measure designed to protect domestic industries from
injury caused by imports. 36 As a result, the special “rebalancing”
provisions of the Safeguards Agreement (discussed in more detail
below) apply here, and justify immediate retaliation. 37
In addition to these retaliatory tariffs, over the period from April
2018 to August 2018, nine governments requested consultations at the
WTO, which is the first step in WTO litigation. WTO litigation can
take several years, though, and no one was expecting a quick ruling,
which is why they retaliated pursuant to the safeguards rebalancing
J. Trump is Addressing Unfair Trade Practices That Threaten to Harm Our National Security,
WHITEHOUSE (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/presidentdonald-j-trump-addressing-unfair-trade-practices-threaten-harm-national-security/
[https://perma.cc/F75W-6TKD].
34. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Dec. 4, 2018, 7:03 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1069970500535902208 [https://perma.cc/CG45C7RF]:
I am a Tariff Man. When people or countries come in to raid the great wealth of our
Nation, I want them to pay for the privilege of doing so. It will always be the best
way to max out our economic power. We are right now taking in $billions [sic] in
Tariffs. MAKE AMERICA RICH AGAIN.
35. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art.
22, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2,
1869 U.N.T.S. 401.
36. Panels established to review US steel and aluminum tariffs, countermeasures on US
imports, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news18_
e/dsb_19nov18_e.htm [https://perma.cc/Z4VJ-79XM].
37. Canada imposed 10 to 25 percent tariffs on approximately US$12.05 billion of US
exports. Mexico imposed tariffs ranging from 7 to 25 percent on US$3.7 billion of US exports.
The European Union imposed 10 to 25 percent duties on US$2.91 billion worth of US exports.
China imposed 15 to 25 percent tariffs on US$2.52 billion worth of US exports. India, Russia,
and Turkey also imposed tariffs on selected US products, ranging from 4 to 140 percent. FEFER
ET AL., supra note 10; see also Current Foreign Retaliatory Actions, INT’L TRADE ADMIN. (Apr.
5,
2019),
https://www.trade.gov/mas/ian/tradedisputes-enforcement/retaliations/tg_ian_
002094.asp [https://perma.cc/E8CW-FF9Q].
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theory. The complaining governments represent a wide range of the
WTO Membership, including both big and small, and developed and
developing: Canada, China, the European Union, India, Mexico,
Norway, Russia, Switzerland and Turkey. 38
During the course of November 2018 to January 2019, dispute
settlement panels were established to hear all of these cases. In late
January, the panels were appointed, and litigation will soon begin.39
The panelists are Elbio Rosselli of Uruguay, Esteban Conejos of the
Philippines, and Rodrigo Valenzuela of Chile.40 All have served on
WTO panels before, but their task in handling this case will
nevertheless be a difficult one.
The complainants’ legal claims are fairly straightforward,
focusing on GATT Article I (MFN treatment) and GATT Article II
(tariff commitments). 41 But as discussed in the next section, it is the US
defense that will be a challenge to the system, as the United States has
invoked GATT Article XXI. As repeatedly stated by the United States
at the relevant DSB meetings, in the US view, after Article XXI is
invoked the panel cannot even hear the case. In the context of the EU
complaint, the United States described its position as follows:
Because the United States has invoked Article XXI, there is no
basis for a WTO panel to review the claims of breach raised by the
European Union. Nor is there any basis for a WTO panel to review
the invocation of Article XXI by the United States. . . . If the EU
maintains its misguided request for a panel to make findings that
the United States has not acted consistently with WTO rules in this
dispute, there is no finding a panel could make other than to note
that the United States has invoked Article XXI. 42

While the steel and aluminum tariffs have already caused great
friction, an even bigger Section 232 test lies ahead: President Trump is
38. FEFER ET AL., supra note 10.
39. Simon Lester, Panels Composed in the Section 232/Retaliation Cases, INT’L ECON. L.
& POL’Y BLOG (Jan. 28, 2019), https://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2019/01/panelscomposed-in-the-section-232retaliation-cases.html [https://perma.cc/YUP6-FUZD].
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., Request for Consultation by the European Union, United States - Certain
Measures on Steel and Aluminum Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS548/1 (June 1, 2018).
42. Statements by the United States at the Meeting of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body,
16, WT/DS184/15/ADD.189 (Nov. 21, 2018), https://geneva.usmission.gov/wp-content/
uploads/sites/290/Nov21.DSB_.Stmt_.as-deliv.fin_.public.pdf [https://perma.cc/5T5E-CVKY].
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considering taking action against imports of automobiles. If the case
for trade restrictions on steel and aluminum is a stretch, the case for
trade restrictions on automobiles bends the rules even further. The
value of trade potentially affected would be much larger than is the case
with steel and aluminum. It is estimated that the Section 232 auto tariffs
could cover over US$200 billion of auto and auto parts imports. 43
Some US trading partners have already warned that they will retaliate
if tariffs are imposed. 44It was reported that the Commerce Department
submitted its report to President Trump in February 2019. 45 President
Trump has ninety days from that date to make a decision.
IV. THE THREAT TO THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
MECHANISM
The administration’s use of Section 232 presents a challenge to
the WTO dispute settlement system, and even to the WTO itself, due
to the invocation of GATT Article XXI. WTO dispute settlement has
had good success over the years in adjudicating core trade issues such
as ordinary tariffs, trade remedy tariffs, and regulatory trade barriers. It
cannot induce governments to remove the measures that violate WTO
rules in every case, but it has a fairly good record of pushing
governments to comply at least partially. However, there are limits to
what can be achieved, and it is clear that some sensitive measures
cannot be dealt with through WTO litigation, just as domestic
constitutional law cannot resolve every political issue effectively.
National security measures pretty clearly fall into this category, and
thus litigation of these measures has been carefully avoided over the
years. But after decades of restraint over litigating the scope and
meaning of Article XXI, the Section 232 measures threaten to
undermine the system by creating a WTO litigation outcome that either
one side or the other cannot live with.
Article XXI is not like most other WTO provisions, for two
reasons. First, its legal interpretation is particularly difficult.
43. Robinson, et al., supra note 28.
44. Doug Palmer & Megan Cassella, U.S. Allies Warn of Retaliation if Trump Imposes
Auto Tariffs, POLITICO (July 19, 2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/07/19/trump-autotariff-commerce-hearing-698100 [https://perma.cc/YKK3-DBPB].
45. David Lawder & David Shepardson, U.S. agency submits auto tariff probe report to
White House, REUTERS (Feb. 17, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-autos/usagency-submits-auto-tariff-probe-report-to-white-house-idUSKCN1Q706C
[https://perma.cc/AR9C-ZGNB].
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Interpretation always presents challenges, but the unique wording of
Article XXI is a special problem. And second, the sensitivity of the
issues involved is greater than for any other provision. Protecting the
environment is serious, but protecting your citizens from possible war
or similar armed conflict rises to another level.
In terms of the law, there is no simple answer on the question of
the provision’s meaning. The use of the word “considers” in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of Article XXI gives the provision a degree of
“self-judgment”, but the question is how far to take this. Alford
describes the interpretive possibilities as follows:
According to one interpretation, a Member State can decide for
itself whether a measure is essential to its security interests and
relates to one of the enumerated conditions. Another interpretation
would recognize a Member State’s prerogative to determine for
itself whether a security exception is applicable, but would impose
a good faith standard that is subject to judicial review. Under a
third interpretation, a Member State can decide for itself whether
“it considers” a measure to be “necessary for the protection of its
essential security interests,” but the enumerated conditions are
subject to judicial review. 46

Questions about the scope of the exception were raised during the
GATT negotiations, but they are not easy to resolve as an interpretive
matter. 47 There is no obvious and clear correct answer to the degree of
scrutiny that is appropriate based on the language of Article XXI.
This legal uncertainty is reflected in a political divide. Two
leading powers, the United States and Russia, take one view of the
provision’s interpretation, while much of the WTO membership takes
another. The different sides to the issue were brought out in the parties’
46. Alford, supra note 8, at 704.
47. Simon Lester, The Drafting History of GATT Article XXI: The U.S. View of the Scope
of the Security Exception, INT’L ECON. L. & POL’Y BLOG (Mar. 11, 2018),
https://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2018/03/drafting-history-of-gatt-article-xxi.html
[https://perma.cc/7L38-VFEH]; Simon Lester, The Drafting History of GATT Article XXI:
Where Did ‘Considers’ Come From?, INT’L ECON. L. & POL’Y BLOG (Mar. 13, 2018),
https://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2018/03/draft-of-gatt-security-exceptionconsiders.html [https://perma.cc/VDM5-XKRU]; Simon Lester, More GATT Article XXI
Negotiating History, INT’L ECON. L. & POL’Y BLOG (May 1, 2018),
https://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2018/05/more-gatt-article-xxi-negotiatinghistory.html [https://perma.cc/NEN7-JD6C].
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and third parties’ submissions in a WTO case referred to as Russia Traffic in Transit. 48 On one side, the United States and Russia argue
that the WTO “security” provisions are completely self-judging. In
their view, once a party has invoked Article XXI, the WTO panel can
no longer hear the case. Russia states that “neither the Panel nor the
WTO as an institution has a jurisdiction” over the dispute; 49 and the
United States argues that:
The text of Article XXI, establishing that its invocation is nonjusticiable, is supported by the drafting history of Article XXI. In
particular, certain proposals from the United States during that
process demonstrate that the revisions to what became Article XXI
reflect the intention of the negotiators that the defence be selfjudging, and not subject to the same review as the general
exceptions contained in GATT 1994 Article XX. 50

In contrast, other Members believe that WTO panels must engage
in some degree of scrutiny of measures for which Article XXI has been
invoked. For instance, the European Union argues that “Article XXI of
GATT 1994 is a justiciable provision and that its invocation by a
defending party does not have the effect of excluding the jurisdiction
of a panel.” 51 And Australia states that, “[T]his deference to Russia
does not preclude the Panel from undertaking any review of Russia’s
48. The WTO panel report in this case was circulated on April 5, 2019, while this article
was in the publication process, so we do not discuss it in depth here. WTO Panel Report, Russia–
Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, WTO Doc. WT/DS512/R (adopted Apr. 5, 2019). The
panel's reasoning establishes that WTO panels have the authority to scrutinize measures for
which a national security justification is claimed, and sets out a legal standard for doing so. Id.
In this case, the panel found that the Russian measures at issue were justified under Article XXI.
Id. The panel report was not appealed and was adopted by the DSB on April 26, 2019. Members
adopt national security ruling on Russian Federation’s transit restrictions, WORLD TRADE
ORG. (Apr. 26, 2019), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news19_e/dsb_26apr19_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/PXD2-VH3R]. The absence of an Appellate Body ruling on these issues leaves
some uncertainty as to the definitive scope of the provision.
49. European Union Third Party Written Submission, Russia - Measures Concerning
Traffic in Transit, ¶ 10, WT/DS512 (Nov. 8, 2017), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/
february/tradoc_156602.pdf [https://perma.cc/KF8W-9B3A].
50. U.S. Responses to the Panel’s and Russia’s Questions to Third Parties, Russia –
Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, ¶ 3, WTO Doc. WT/DS512/R (Feb. 20, 2018),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/DS/US.3d.Pty.As.Pnl.and.Rus.Qs.fin.(public).p
df [https://perma.cc/52JG-GPWM].
51. European Union Third Party Written Submission, Russia - Measures Concerning
Traffic in Transit, ¶ 21, WT/DS512 (Nov. 8, 2017), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/
february/tradoc_156602.pdf [https://perma.cc/SZ4W-ATMX].
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invocation of Article XXI(b) or dispense with the Panel’s obligation to
undertake an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an
objective assessment of the facts of the case.” 52
The Russian - Traffic in Transit case and the Section 232 cases are
not the only WTO disputes involving national security right now. In
United Arab Emirates—Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and
Services, and Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(DS 526), 53 the UAE has argued that the measures at issue were
adopted for national security reasons, and thus the UAE’s measures are
allowed by Article XXI, Article XIVbis of the GATS, and Article 73
of the TRIPS Agreement. The WTO DSB, according to the UAE, does
not have the jurisdiction nor the capacity to adjudicate national security
issues. 54 And in Saudi Arabia—Measures Concerning the Protection
of Intellectual Property Rights (DS567), 55 Saudi Arabia argued that the
national security exemption means the WTO has no jurisdiction to hear
the dispute, noting that “the WTO is not, and cannot be turned into, a
venue to resolve national security disputes.” 56 After decades of peace
in GATT/WTO dispute settlement with regard to the national security
issue, we are suddenly experiencing a proliferation of litigation.
Making the issue even more complicated for WTO dispute
settlement is the state of the Appellate Body reappointment process.
Currently, the United States is blocking the appointment of new
52. Australia’s Third Party Executive Summary, Russia-Measures Concerning Traffic in
Transit, ¶ 30, WT/DS512 (Feb. 27, 2018), https://dfat.gov.au/trade/organisations/wto/wtodisputes/Documents/ds512-australian-third-party-executive-summary-270218.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P6HU-NHD2].
53. Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Qatar, United Arab Emirates – Measures
Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, and Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, WTO Doc. WT/DS526/2 (Oct. 6, 2017).
54. Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting – Held in the Centre William Rappard,
¶ 4.4, WT/DSB/M/403 (Oct. 23, 2017) (“The system was simply not equipped to adjudicate the
national security issues raised …, nor was there any support for the notion that it was intended
to adjudicate such issues. … there was clear language … that excluded such national security
matters from the jurisdiction of the WTO.”) [hereinafter DSB Minutes].
55. Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Qatar, Saudi Arabia – Measures
Concerning the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, WTO Doc. WT/DS567/3 (Nov. 9,
2018).
56. Panels Established to Review India, Swiss Complaints Against US Tariffs, WORLD
TRADE ORG. (Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news18_e/dsb_
04dec18_e.htm [https://perma.cc/7RHD-P5NH] [hereinafter WTO Panel Established]
(“[N]othing can require any government to engage in dispute settlement procedures in such
circumstances of national security. A panel has no power to make a finding in this matter, and
the WTO is not, and cannot be turned into, a venue to resolve national security disputes, Saudi
Arabia said”).
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Appellate Body Members (i.e., judges) which has created a backlog of
appeals and the possibility that by the end of the year there will not be
enough people on the Appellate Body to hear cases. 57 The result could
be a WTO panel ruling on one of the national security cases that gets
appealed and sent into limbo. Until the status of the Appellate Body
going forward is clarified, a great deal of uncertainty will remain.
However, there is a larger problem than figuring out the proper
interpretation of the provision: if a WTO panel or the Appellate Body
were to rule that Article XXI did not justify the US steel and aluminum
tariffs, would the United States comply with that ruling? Given the US
rhetoric on this issue, this seems unlikely. 58 And in the event of noncompliance, the only remedy is for the DSB to authorize a suspension
of concessions under which the complainants could impose tariffs or
other retaliation of their own, but most of the complainants have
already retaliated, relying on the legal theory that the US measures are
safeguard measures and that “rebalancing” under Safeguards
Agreement Article 8 is permitted immediately. 59 As a matter of law,
such an assertion has little basis, and further undermines confidence in
the system. The Section 232 measure was not taken pursuant to the US
domestic safeguards law; it was not notified to the WTO as a
safeguards measure; and its design, structure, and architecture makes
clear that it is not a safeguard measure. 60 Responding to violations of
the rules with other violations of the rules leaves everyone wondering
if the rules have any value. As a result, it is not clear how WTO dispute
settlement can help in this case. With such a broad loophole being

57. James Bacchus, How to Solve the WTO Judicial Crisis, CATO AT LIBERTY (Aug. 6,
2018), https://www.cato.org/blog/how-solve-wto-judicial-crisis [https://perma.cc/5NADZ962].
58. In a recent DSB meeting, the United States reiterated that its invocation of Article XXI
should not be reviewed by the panel: “[A WTO review] would undermine the legitimacy of the
WTO’s dispute settlement system and even the viability of the WTO itself.” WTO Panel
Established, supra note 56.
59. For an overview of rebalancing under the Safeguards Agreement, see Matthew R.
Nicely & David T. Hardin, Article 8 of the WTO Safeguards Agreement: Reforming the Right to
Rebalance, 23 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT 699 (2008).
60. Simon Lester, How To Determine if a Measure Constitutes a Safeguard Measure,
INT’L ECON. L. & POL’Y BLOG, (Aug. 15, 2018), https://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/
2018/08/how-to-determine-if-a-measure-constitutes-a-safeguard-measure.html
[https://perma.cc/4392-ZWKW]. For more discussion on the issue, see Steve Charnovitz, EU
Can Retaliate Immediately Against Trump’s Metal Tariffs, INT’L ECON. L. & POL’Y BLOG,
(Mar.
9,
2018),
https://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2018/03/eu-can-retaliateimmediately-against-trumps-metal-tariffs.html [https://perma.cc/STF8-NVW9].
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exposed, and triggering a response that opens another loophole, there
are real concerns that the system will be seriously undermined.
At the same time, while “rebalancing” as practiced by US trading
partners here may not solve the problem, the concept may nevertheless
offer a way forward for this kind of dispute. By adapting it for use
directly in the context of national security, “rebalancing” could provide
a solution to the impasse. While an attempt to expand existing
safeguards rebalancing rules beyond their scope undermines the rule of
law, a new rebalancing regime designed specifically for the national
security context could help restore it.
V. REBALANCING UNDER THE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT
The idea of some type of “rebalancing” in response to “safeguard”
measures originates in the reciprocal trade agreements negotiated by
the United States and other countries in the 1930s. 61 The first modern
safeguard provision appeared in the US-Mexico Reciprocal Trade
Agreement of 1942. It provides that where a country will “withdraw or
modify a concession” as a safeguard to protect domestic industry, “it
shall give notice in writing to the Government of the other country as
far in advance as may be practicable and shall afford such other
Government an opportunity to consult with it in respect of the proposed
action”; if no agreement is reached, the other government “shall be free
within thirty days after such action is taken to terminate this Agreement
in whole or in part on thirty days’ written notice.” 62 The consultations
provide an opportunity for the parties to reach agreement on
compensation, e.g., lowering tariffs on other products. 63
This idea was carried over to the GATT negotiations, where the
United States proposed the initial text. At this point, “termination” was
replaced with “suspension of obligations or concessions” as the
response where compensation could not be agreed. 64 The provision
61.
62.
63.
64.

See, e.g., Reciprocal Trade Agreement of 1938 art. 19, U.K.-U.S., Nov. 17, 1938.
Reciprocal Trade Agreement of 1942 art. 11 ¶ 2, Dec. 23, 1942.
JOHN JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 565 (1969).
See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 3, art. 29 ¶ 2:

If agreement among the interested Members with respect to the proposed action is
not reached, the Member which proposes to take the action shall, nevertheless, be
free to do so, and if such action is taken the other affected Members shall then be
free, within sixty days after such action is taken, to suspend on sixty days’ written
notice to the Organization the application to the trade of the Member taking such
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was refined further during the negotiations, and the London Draft of
the GATT refers to suspension of “substantially equivalent obligations
or concessions.” 65 In the final version of the GATT, the relevant
provisions appear in Article XIX, paragraphs two and three. 66
action, of any of the obligations or concessions under this Chapter the suspension
of which the Organization does not recommend against.
65. See London Draft of a Charter for an International Trade Organization, art. 34 ¶ 2:
If agreement among the interested Members with respect to the action is not
reached, the Member which proposes to take or continue the action shall,
nevertheless, be free to do so, and if such action is taken or continued the other
affected Members shall then be free, not later than sixty days after such action is
taken, to suspend, upon the expiration of sixty days from the date on which written
notice of such suspension is received by the Organization, the application to the
trade of the Member taking such action, of such substantially equivalent
obligations or concessions under this Chapter the suspension of which the
Organization does not oppose.
66. GATT, supra note 4, art. XIX ¶ 2 states:
Before any contracting party shall take action pursuant to the provisions of
paragraph 1 of this Article, it shall give notice in writing to the CONTRACTING
PARTIES as far in advance as may be practicable and shall afford the
CONTRACTING PARTIES and those contracting parties having a substantial
interest as exporters of the product concerned an opportunity to consult with it in
respect of the proposed action. When such notice is given in relation to a
concession with respect to a preference, the notice shall name the contracting party
which has requested the action. In critical circumstances, where delay would cause
damage which it would be difficult to repair, action under paragraph 1 of this
Article may be taken provisionally without prior consultation, on the condition
that consultation shall be effected immediately after taking such action.
See also GATT art. XIX ¶ 3:
(a) If agreement among the interested contracting parties with respect to the action
is not reached, the contracting party which proposes to take or continue the action
shall, nevertheless, be free to do so, and if such action is taken or continued, the
affected contracting parties shall then be free, not later than ninety days after such
action is taken, to suspend, upon the expiration of thirty days from the day on
which written notice of such suspension is received by the CONTRACTING
PARTIES, the application to the trade of the contracting party taking such action,
or, in the case envisaged in paragraph 1 (b) of this Article, to the trade of the
contracting party requesting such action, of such substantially equivalent
concessions or other obligations under this Agreement the suspension of which
the CONTRACTING PARTIES do not disapprove.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph, where
action is taken under paragraph 2 of this Article without prior consultation and
causes or threatens serious injury in the territory of a contracting party to the
domestic producers of products affected by the action, that contracting party shall,

1468 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:5

Practice during the time of the GATT suggests that compensation
was used extensively early on. However, it tapered off over the years.
As of 1987, there had been twenty instances of agreement or offers of
compensation (ten cases during 1950-59, eight cases in 1960-69, one
case in 1970-79 and one case in 1980-87). 67
During the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, the specific
requirements for rebalancing were discussed and debated at great
length, 68 and the provision evolved over the course of the talks. 69 In the
end, the GATT Article XIX requirements were elaborated further in the
Safeguards Agreement. Under Article 8 of the Agreement, a
government proposing to apply a safeguard measure or seeking an
extension of a safeguard measure shall try to maintain a substantially
equivalent level of concessions and other obligations, and in order to
achieve this objective, “the Members concerned may agree on any
adequate means of trade compensation for the adverse effects of the
measure on their trade.” 70 If compensation cannot be agreed, retaliation
is permitted almost immediately where the justification for the
safeguard measure is based only on a relative increase in imports, but
has to wait three years if there has been an absolute increase in
imports. 71
where delay would cause damage difficult to repair, be free to suspend, upon the
taking of the action and throughout the period of consultation, such concessions
or other obligations as may be necessary to prevent or remedy the injury.
67. GATT Secretariat, Drafting History of Article XIX and Its Place in GATT, GATT Doc.
MTN.GNG/NG9/W/7, ¶ 22 (Sept. 16, 1987), https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/
SULPDF/92020271.pdf [https://perma.cc/ER2Y-D3SD]; WORLD TRADE ORG., ANALYTICAL
INDEX OF THE GATT 525 (1995), available at https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/
publications_e/ai17_e/gatt1994_art19_gatt47.pdf [https://perma.cc/MAE5-E94P] [hereinafter
GATT Index].
68. 2 THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992) 1773-74
(Terence P. Stewart ed., 1993).
69. See Safeguards, Draft Text by the Chairman, MTN.GNG/NG9/W/25, paras. 23-25,
June 27, 1989; Safeguards, Draft Text by the Chairman, Revision 1,
MTN.GNG/NG9/W/25/Rev.1, paras. 25-27, Jan. 15, 1990; Chairman’s Report on the Status of
Work in the Negotiating Group, MTN.GNG/NG9/W/25/Rev.2, paras. 16-18, July 13, 1990;
Draft Text of an Agreement, MTN.GNG/NG9/W/25/Rev.3, paras. 17-19, Oct. 31, 1990.
70. Agreement on Safeguards, art. 8 ¶ 1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Agreement on
Safeguards].
71. Agreement on Safeguards, art. 8 ¶ 3 states:
The right of suspension referred to in paragraph 2 shall not be exercised for the
first three years that a safeguard measure is in effect, provided that the safeguard
measure has been taken as a result of an absolute increase in imports and that such
a measure conforms to the provisions of this Agreement.
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The basic idea behind rebalancing is as follows. When countries
negotiate trade agreements, the “concessions” and other obligations
they take on—including commitments to reduce tariffs, to avoid certain
protectionist domestic laws, and various other obligations—are part of
an overall balance. Roughly speaking, each side accepts a particular
degree of liberalization or other obligations, which constitutes the
balance that was agreed to.
There are times when things get out of balance, however. One
example is where a government believes another government has taken
actions that violate the agreement. After adjudication of this matter, if
a violation is found, the offending government can remove or modify
the measure or offer some sort of compensation. If it does not do either
one, it will be subject to trade retaliation by the complaining
government in an amount equivalent to the effect of the violation. In
this way, the balance is restored.
In some circumstances, adjudication is not required first. In the
context of safeguards, the very nature of the measure indicates that the
balance has been upset. If a government imposes a tariff or quota as a
safeguard measure, with rare exceptions that measure will constitute
withdrawal or modification of a tariff concession or breach of the
obligation not to impose quotas. When that happens, the balance needs
to be restored. Ideally, that would take place through compensation in
the form of trade liberalization in other areas by the government
imposing the safeguard measure. However, where compensation
cannot be worked out, the affected countries are allowed to raise their
own tariffs in an equivalent amount. That may not be ideal from the
perspective of trade liberalization, but it acts as a deterrent against the
abusive use of safeguard measures.
VI. A REBALANCING PROPOSAL FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
Under WTO rules, governments may impose tariffs and other
trade restrictions beyond what was agreed for a variety of reasons,
including the following: temporary protection as safeguards; as a
response to dumping or subsidies; for environmental, public morals, or
public health reasons; or in support of national security. 72 It is a
political and policy decision whether to make rebalancing available.
Traditionally, immediate rebalancing has only been available for
72. See GATT, supra note 4, arts. XIX, VI, XX, and XXI.
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safeguards, but the case could be made for rebalancing in other contexts
too.
In thinking about the circumstances in which rebalancing should
be available, the following two categories of challenged measures may
help guide the analysis. The first category is measures that are alleged
to violate WTO obligations, but for which consistency is contested:
The complaining party claims there is a violation, but the responding
party denies it (the responding party may invoke an exception as well).
For these measures, if a violation is found by a WTO panel or the
Appellate Body, the complaining party hopes that the measure will be
brought into compliance (or at least applied in a manner that is
consistent with certain core GATT principles, in the case of the Article
XX chapeau). 73 If it is not brought into compliance, retaliation or
compensation (i.e. rebalancing) are available. Thus, in these situations,
compliance is the objective, but eventual rebalancing can be accepted
as an alternative solution.
The second category is measures which are acknowledged to
violate the rules, and there is no hope of achieving compliance as long
as the conditions in an exception are satisfied. With safeguard
measures, for example, there is no question that the withdrawal of a
concession violates the rules, and there is no hope of compliance
(unless the conditions for imposing a safeguard measure have not been
satisfied, of course, in which case the measure must be withdrawn). As
a result, for safeguard measures, the step involving a determination of
whether the measure violates general GATT obligations such as
Articles II and XI is not necessary in order to rebalance, as immediate
rebalancing is available. 74
Consider the difference between a safeguard measure, on the one
hand, and an environmental measure under GATT Article XX(g), on
the other. 75 The main issue in a typical safeguard case at the WTO is
whether the measure satisfies the conditions for being classified as a
safeguard measure. 76 If it does, any inconsistency with general
principles such as complying with tariff commitments is irrelevant. By
contrast, for environmental measures, compliance with the obligations
is almost always contested, and even if a measure is classified as an
73. GATT, supra note 4, art. XX.
74. See GATT, supra note 4, art. XIX; Agreement on Safeguards, supra note 70, art. 8.
75. GATT, supra note 4, art. XX(g).
76. See, e.g., Agreement on Safeguards, supra note 70, art. 4 ("Determination of Serious
Injury or Threat Thereof").
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environmental measure that falls under Article XX(g), the obligations
in the Article XX chapeau apply, providing another opportunity to
consider whether the measure is justified.
National security fits much more naturally into the safeguard
category. Where national security is invoked, a violation is generally
assumed and not contested. If the national security justification is
upheld, there is no hope of inducing compliance with WTO obligations,
and thus moving on to the rebalancing stage immediately is
appropriate.
Beyond the theory of these two different categories of measures,
in the national security context there are several practical arguments for
allowing a similar kind of rebalancing. First, retaliation is already
happening. In the case of the Section 232 tariffs, as noted above, a
number of governments have declared the measures to be safeguard
measures and are applying retaliatory tariffs. 77 Instituting rebalancing
rules here would provide an opportunity to replace retaliatory tariffs
with compensatory liberalization. In addition, in circumstances where
compensation is not possible, it would formalize the retaliation process
and make it more orderly, limiting the possibility of a trade war that
spirals out of control.
Second, as explained earlier, WTO dispute settlement probably
cannot help here. A ruling that the Section 232 measures violate GATT
obligations and are not justified under Article XXI is not likely to make
the United States comply. In addition, retaliation is already being
imposed by many countries even without authorization.
Finally, rebalancing would have an important benefit by limiting
the abuse of the provisions. A full WTO dispute proceeding typically
lasts between two and four years, depending on the complexity of the
case. National security measures are particularly susceptible to abuse
due to the vagueness of the obligation, and rebalancing would reduce
the time that governments can impose import restrictions for national
security purposes without any response from trading partners.
Rebalancing of national security measures can draw on principles
from the safeguards arena, but would have its own characteristics and
a different focus. One of its primary goals would be transparency. As
things stand now, governments have the ability to impose trade
restrictions for protectionist purposes but then later invoke Article XXI
during litigation. There are requirements that Members “should be
77. FEFER ET AL., supra note 10.
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informed to the fullest extent possible of trade measures taken under”
GATT Article XXI and GATS Article XIV bis, 78 but the notification
obligation needs to be stronger. It would be desirable to have all
national security trade restrictions notified as such immediately upon
their imposition, and even during the process of internal domestic
deliberation, in order to have a proper debate and discussion. Bringing
these cases to light early, and having WTO Members think carefully
about the proper scope of the exception, is of great value. To this end,
the national security rebalancing rules should encourage notification
and explanation of national security tariffs by offering more time
before rebalancing can be applied where measures have been notified.
For example, rebalancing can be immediate where an Article XXI
justification is invoked as part of litigation where there has been no
notification/explanation, but must wait six months to a year where
notification has been given.
To help oversee these discussions, there should be a Committee
on National Security Measures formed to examine these measures and
any proposed rebalancing, through which Members could meet
regularly to consider the practice in this area. Committees play an
important role in many policy areas covered by the WTO and could
help with national security issues as well. Committee meetings provide
an opportunity to resolve conflicts outside the context of litigation,
which is inherently contentious and can increase tensions.
Compensation is the preferred approach to rebalancing. Ideally,
governments that impose tariffs or other restrictions on specific
products for national security purposes would offer to reduce tariffs or
restrictions on other products or services. Adding services as a
compensation option may be significant. One of the reasons
compensation has not worked as well in recent years in the safeguards
context is that as tariff levels have decreased, it has become harder for
countries invoking safeguards to find alternative products on which
they could give meaningful concessions. 79 Adding services to the mix
78. See Decision Concerning Article XXI of the General Agreement, ¶ 1, WTO Doc.
L/5426 (Dec. 2, 1982), https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/english/SULPDF/91000212.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6DB2-WZU4]; GATT Index, supra note 67, at 606, available at
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/gatt_ai_e/art21_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/KQ3VB35X]; General Agreement on Trade in Services art. XIV bis ¶ 2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183.
79. JOHN JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 168 (1994); Chad Bown & Meredith
Crowley, Safeguards in the World Trade Organization, CATO INST. (Feb. 2003),
http://people.brandeis.edu/~cbown/papers/bown_crowley_kluwer.pdf [https://perma.cc/78AU-

2019]

PROPOSAL FOR REBALANCING

1473

would open a wide range of compensation possibilities, especially
considering how few services commitments most countries have made
and thus how much potential there is for additional liberalization.
Negotiations over the extent of this compensation will never be
easy, but they can be facilitated through carefully designed rules. For
example, there could be a requirement that in order to impose an import
restriction for national security reasons, a government must identify
three products or services for which it would consider negotiating
compensatory liberalization. Forcing governments to suggest possible
compensation could give the negotiating process a boost.
When compensation cannot be agreed, however, retaliation
designed to restore balance is also a possibility. Retaliation is contrary
to the main purpose of trade agreement, which is trade liberalization,
but if it can serve as a deterrent to protectionist abuses (by creating a
negative impact on producers in the imposing country), it can serve a
useful role. It can also keep trade wars from spiraling out of control by
establishing an agreed upon procedure for retaliatory tariffs.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Not every dispute can be resolved through litigation. The
proposals outlined here are designed to help provide a political solution
to disputes over trade restrictions based on national security. They are
fairly straightforward as a policy matter, although much more debate is
needed on the specific details. This paper is intended to launch a
discussion and is certainly not the final word.
As governments continue to push forward with bilateral, regional
and multilateral trade agreements, there will be opportunities to
experiment with this kind of mechanism. The Trump administration is
unlikely to support the proposals made here, but other governments that
are concerned about the abuse of national security measures can
incorporate provisions along these lines in agreements they sign. In this
way, the norm can spread, with the hope that its usefulness will be

JAHM] (“Although compensation for safeguard measures was often negotiated in the 1960s and
1970s, as tariff rates fell and more products came to be freely traded, as a practical matter, it
became difficult for countries to agree on compensation packages”). See also Matthew R. Nicely
& David T. Hardin, Article 8 of the WTO Safeguards Agreement: Reforming the Right to
Rebalance, 23 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT 699, 716 (2008), available at
https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1044&context=jcred
[https://perma.cc/HB9U-GZT4].
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demonstrated, and with the aim of eventual inclusion in a multilateral
agreement.

